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Abstract​: Consciousness scientists have not reached consensus on two of the most central             
questions in their field: first, on whether consciousness overflows reportability; second, on            
the physical basis of consciousness. I review the scientific literature of the 19th century to               
provide evidence that disagreement on these questions has been a feature of the scientific              
study of consciousness for a long time. Based on this historical review, I hypothesize that a                
unifying explanation of disagreement on these questions, up to this day, is that scientific              
theories of consciousness are underdetermined by the evidence, namely, that they can be             
preserved “come what may” in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence. Consciousness           
scientists may have to find a way of solving the persistent underdetermination of theories of               
consciousness to make further progress.  
 
 Introduction 
Scientists studying consciousness have been unable to settle two central debates in the             
field. The first is about whether subjects are conscious of more than they can report: some                
researchers believe that consciousness and reportability are equivalent (Dehaene &          
Changeux, 2011; Naccache, 2018), while others think that consciousness overflows          
reportability (Block, 1995, 2007; Lamme, 2010). The second debate is about the            
identification of the physical basis of consciousness (e.g., Boly et al., 2017; Odegaard et. al.               
2017). In this debate, theories according to which consciousness pervades the universe            
co-exist with theories suggesting that some specific parts of the cortex are responsible for              
consciousness (Tononi & Koch, 2015; Dehaene et al., 2014). My goal is to understand why               
consciousness scientists do not reach consensus on these questions. 
One could argue that there is not much to explain here, for disagreement in the study                
of consciousness is not very surprising: consciousness is difficult to study, and we shouldn’t              
expect to solve these challenging problems in a snap. After all, one might say, the scientific                
study of consciousness appeared relatively recently in the history of science. A popular             
opinion among consciousness scientists, indeed, is that the first attempts to scientifically            
answer all these questions began in the 1990s, with a series of landmarks articles, such as                
Crick & Koch’s “Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness” (1990). 
This article has two parts: in the first part, I show that the view according to which                 
lack of consensus on the overflow debate and on the physical bases of consciousness has               
been going on for a short period of time is wrong. To defend that claim, I argue, first, that                   
researchers studying consciousness in the 19th century developed a research program that            
was very similar to the current science of consciousness, and, second, that early             
consciousness researchers failed to solve the same problems as those that elicit            
disagreement among contemporary consciousness scientists.  
In the second part of this article, I attempt to explain why consciousness scientists              
have not reached consensus on the overflow debate and on the physical bases of              
consciousness after all this time. I will hypothesize that the underdetermination of scientific             
theories of consciousness by the evidence provides a unifying explanation of the difficulties             





 1. The early scientific study of consciousness 
In this section, I show that early consciousness researchers developed a research program             
similar to that of the contemporary science of consciousness. 
 
1.1. The Leibnizian framework and the cognitive problem of consciousness 
To present the early scientific study of consciousness, it is useful to start from a               
disagreement between the Cartesian and the Leibnizian traditions on the nature of the mind,              
and more specifically, on the existence of ​unconscious mental activities . William Hamilton,            1
one of the first British thinkers to introduce the Leibnizian framework in Britain, describes the               
difference between these two philosophical traditions: 
The question I refer to is, Whether the mind exerts energies, and is the subject of                
modifications, of neither of which it is conscious. This is the most general expression of a                
problem which has hardly been mentioned, far less mooted, in this country [England]; and              
when it has attracted a passing notice, the supposition of an unconscious action or              
passion of the mind has been treated as something either unintelligible, or absurd. In              
Germany, on the contrary, it has not only been canvassed, but the alternative which the               
philosophers of this country have lightly considered as ridiculous, has been gravely            
established as a conclusion which the phenomena not only warrant, but enforce            
(Hamilton, 1836, p.338).  2
The idea of unconscious perception seemed “unintelligible, or absurd” to philosophers           
belonging to the Cartesian and British traditions because they saw consciousness as the             
defining feature of the mind (​mens​, ​l’esprit​) . Descartes writes: 3
Thought​. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are                   
immediately aware [​conscii​] of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the               
imagination and the senses are thoughts. I say ‘immediately’ so as to exclude the              
1 Here and below, I rely on Simmons’ interpretation (2001) of the differences between the Cartesian                
and Leibnizian views of the mind. Danziger has also provided a very similar interpretation of the                
opposition between the Cartesian and Leibnizian traditions (1980). 
2 John Daniel Morell (1862) makes a very similar remark at the beginning of a chapter entitled                 
“Preconscious Mental Activity”: “[Cartesians] regard consciousness as wholly inseparable from mental           
activity. The same principle passed, through Locke, into the modern English school of metaphysics,              
and became a fixed idea with nearly all English writers on mental philosophy down to comparatively                
recent times. On the Continent, and especially in Germany, another and altogether different course              
was pursued. Leibniz denied the Cartesian dogma ​ab initia​, and maintained the doctrine of              
unconscious perception, or latent thought, as a fact which can be verified throughout all the stages of                 
animal life, and in the actual operations of the human mind.” (p.34). 
3 For Descartes, the mind (​mens​, ​l’esprit​) is distinct from the body, and thought is its essence, or                  
principal attribute. 
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 consequences of thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought.            
(Descartes, 1644/1985, ​Principles of Philosophy​, Part I, §9 / CSM II 113) 
Our thoughts can be known directly from a first-person perspective, without the need to infer               
them from our behaviors, and the fact that we are immediately aware of thoughts makes               
them mental phenomena. From this perspective, the idea of unconscious thoughts, or            
unconscious perceptions, is meaningless. For if thoughts and perceptions are unconscious,           
they are not thoughts and perceptions at all. 
On the other hand, following Danziger (1980) and Simmons (2001), we could            
interpret philosophers from the Leibnizian tradition as believing that ​representationality is the            
mark of the mental . In an often quoted passage, Leibniz develops the view that there are                4
“obscure perceptions”: 
at every moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or               
reflection; that is, of alterations in the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these                
impressions are either too minute and too numerous, or else too unvarying, so that they               
are not sufficiently distinctive on their own. (Leibniz, 1704/1996) 
Leibniz explicitly opposed the Cartesians by arguing that they had been “taking for nothing              
the perceptions of which we are not conscious” (Leibniz, 1714/1965, §4). Making full sense              
of Leibniz’s theory of perception is beyond the scope of this article (for an in-depth treatment,                
See Kulstad, 1990; McRae, 1978). For our purpose, the most important novelty in Leibniz’s              
theory was the distinction between perception and consciousness:  
it is good to make a distinction between 'perception', which is ​the internal state of the                
monad representing external things​, and 'apperception', which is 'consciousness', or the           
reflective cognition of this internal state​, which is ​not given to all souls, or at all times to                  
the same soul​. (my emphasis, Leibniz, 1714/1965, §4) 
Following Simmons (2001, 2011) we can reconstruct the Leibnizian distinction between           
perception and consciousness to highlight its differences with the Cartesian view of the             
mind: first, perception is a representational activity; second, consciousness is not an intrinsic             
property of perception, but results from a reflexive cognition on perceptions; and third,             
unconscious perception is possible. For our purpose, the most important aspect of this             
distinction is that consciousness results from what we would regard today as a cognitive              
capacity operating on representations. 
4 Cartesians also thought that mental states have representational components, but they believed that              
they could not be reduced to those (Simmons, 1999). Mental states would be incomplete, for               
Descartes, if they were only defined representationally, for the experiential character of mental states,              
which does not seem to represent anything, would be lacking (Simmons, 2001). 
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 A century after Leibniz, many theories of consciousness developed in the Leibnizian            
tradition testify of a concern for the description of cognitive mechanisms to explain the              
difference between unconscious and conscious activities of the mind (Romand, 2012).           
Herbart’s theory of consciousness provides a good example (Herbart, 1816/1964). Herbart           
formalized the concept of “threshold” (​limen​) in psychology and developed what we can             
interpret as a theory of the cognitive mechanisms by which representations reach the             
threshold of consciousness or fall below it. According to him, representations could become             
conscious through a “conflict of the representations” competing in intensity to occupy            
consciousness. In this competition, representations could gain degrees of consciousness          
and thus reach the threshold for consciousness, or lose degrees of consciousness and             
become “repressed” or “consciousless” . 5
Herbart’s theory highlights the fact that the Leibnizian framework prompted a wealth            
of new questions that were not meaningful in a Cartesian framework (Simmons, 2001). For              
example, trying to explain what makes perception conscious was meaningless in a Cartesian             
framework, just as trying to develop a theory of the selection of representations for              
consciousness. Moreover, answering these questions did not require one to take any            
particular stance on the mind-body problem. For instance, one could evaluate Herbart’s            
theory of consciousness independently of one’s stance on the mind-body problem. Similarly,            
one could remain agnostic on the mind-body problem and yet attempt to solve the problem               
of knowing which mental activities require consciousness, and which do not. To this extent,              
the primary benefit of the Leibnizian framework was to separate the mind-body problem from              
the problem of consciousness, thereby constituting consciousness as an independent target           
for philosophical and scientific investigation. Consciousness became more than a          
metaphysical issue, it also became an empirical problem that could largely be answered             
independently from metaphysical speculations. Insofar as it was distinct from metaphysical           
speculations about consciousness, the problem that interested researchers of the 19th           
century could retrospectively be called the “cognitive problem of consciousness”.          
Reconstructed in contemporary terms, the problem was that of knowing which cognitive            
systems and capacities are essential for consciousness, and by which operations these            
systems transform unconscious representations into conscious representations. 
Except maybe for proponents of the Integrated Information Theory, who do not posit             
the problem of consciousness in representational terms (Tononi et al., 2015), contemporary            
consciousness scientists address the cognitive problem of consciousness. For example, the           
differences between the global workspace theory of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux,           
5 For more on Herbart’s theory of consciousness, see Boudewijnse et al. (1999), and Kim (2015). 
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 2011) and higher-order theories of consciousness (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) can be            
reconstructed as differences on which cognitive systems are supposed to be essential for             
consciousness, and by which operations they contribute to consciousness. On the global            
workspace theory, representations compete for attentional resources and entrance into a           
“global workspace”, the role of which is to broadcast the winning representations to a variety               
of cognitive modules. On this view, the “global broadcast” of a representation is the              
operation by which an unconscious representation is transformed into a conscious           
representation. On the other hand, higher-order theorists, such as Lau & Rosenthal (2011)             
believe that global broadcast often happens unconsciously, which could indicate that this is             
not the operation by which representations become conscious. For them, consciousness           
depends on a cognitive system charged to differentiate signals from noise: when a sensory              
representation is targeted by a higher-order representation which tags it as being a reliable              
signal rather than noise, that sensory representation becomes conscious. These two           
theories of consciousness certainly do not answer the mind/body problem, but rather, are             
interested in solving the cognitive problem of consciousness. As such, as I have shown, at               
least some early consciousness researchers and contemporary consciousness scientists         
were interested in the same questions. I will now show that they attempted to answer these                
questions with remarkably similar research programs. 
 
1.2. Bracketing off the metaphysical 
In the 19th century, more than a century after Leibniz, scientists could attempt to explain               
what we would now regard as ​cognitive problems of consciousness without having to find a               
solution to the mind body problem. 
The fact that most researchers of the 19th century recognized the existence of             
something similar to what would be called the “explanatory gap” a century later (Levine,              
1982) contributed to the separation between, on the one hand, metaphysical problems            
related to consciousness, and, on the other, the cognitive problems that researchers could             
attempt to answer scientifically. The “explanatory gap” is the intuition that physical accounts             
of subjective experiences are unable to explain the connection between physical facts, such             
as brain states, and our subjective experiences. On this view, we could demonstrate that              
physical states correlate with subjective experiences, but we would be unable to explain ​why              
those physical states correlate with ​these subjective experiences, and not with different            
types of experiences, or no experiences at all. A century before Levine coined the term               
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 “explanatory gap”, John Tyndall (1872) provided an illuminating description of a very similar             
problem , which he called an “intellectually impassable chasm”: 6
Granted that a definite thought, and a definite molecular action in the brain, occur              
simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of             
the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one to the                  
other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so                
expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable us to see and feel the very              
molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings, all                
their electric discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the              
corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution                
of the problem, ''How are these physical processes connected with the facts of             
consciousness?" The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain            
intellectually impassable. Let the consciousness of love, for example, be associated with a             
right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate              
with a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know, when we love, that the motion is in                 
one direction, and, when we hate, that the motion is in the other; but the “WHY?” would                 
remain as unanswerable as before. (Tyndall, 1872, p.95) . 7
Here, Tyndall presents the intuition that, even if we had a perfect description of all brain                
processes, and even if we were “intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of             
thought and feeling”, we would still be unable to explain how consciousness emerges from              
physical processes. However, just as the explanatory gap does not prevent the existence of              
contemporary consciousness science, this “intellectually impassable chasm” did not stop the           
emergence of the early scientific study of consciousness. Many physiologists readily           
admitted that the metaphysical problem of consciousness could not be solved, while arguing             
that they could still study the physiological “conditions of consciousness”. For example,            
Maudsley (1887) writes: 
It is certain that by no exercise of consciousness of which we are capable can we explain                 
what it is in itself (…). The aim of sober inquiry is, therefore, to search and, if possible,                  
find out the conditions of consciousness – the conditions, that is to say, under which it                
arises, varies, sinks and lapses. (p.489) 
In a similar vein, Herzen (1886) writes: 
What is consciousness, such that it manifests itself only when the nervous centers are              
functioning in a particular way? And why does it manifests itself only in these conditions?               
6 On Tyndall’s views on materialism and the mind, See Barton (1987). 
7 This thought experiment echoes Leibniz’s “mill analogy”, supposed to show, through a similar              
thought experiment, that machines (or brains) cannot have mental states (Leibniz, 1714). 
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 The essence of consciousness is as inaccessible as the essence of everything else: do              
we know what is matter, or what is force? We don’t. There are primordial, irreducible,               
unexplainable facts that we have to accept as they are, and it would already be a                
significant endeavour if we could specify the conditions under which they appear. That’s             
all we can ask to science. (my translation, Herzen, 1886, p.5). 
As illustrated here, the expression “conditions of consciousness” was used as a            
metaphysically neutral term allowing scientists to make progress on the cognitive problem of             
consciousness while avoiding to set foot into the morass of metaphysical speculations . In             8
this respect, the research strategy developed in the 19th century is strikingly similar to that of                
contemporary consciousness science.  
Indeed, one of the most important goals of the science of consciousness today is to               
discover the "neural correlates of consciousness" (Chalmers, 2000; Crick & Koch, 1990).            
Neisser (2012) is particularly explicit on the role of the term “correlate” in the contemporary               
study of consciousness: “A notable claim on behalf of the correlate idea is that the neutral                
language frees us from philosophical disputes over the mind/body relation, allowing the            
science to move independently” (p.681). Researchers of the 19th century adopted a very             
similar method to get rid of philosophical disputes over the mind/body relation. This way,              
they could attempt to discover the physiological differences between cases in which subjects             
are conscious, and cases in which they are unconscious, as summarized by Herzen: 
If we admit that there is consciousness in some cases, and not others, we are forced to                 
admit that ​there is a difference in the conditions of the phenomenon​. We must now try to                 
know when and why (or rather, in what circumstances) the activity of nervous centers is               
unconscious. (my translation, Herzen, 1886, p.5) 
Just as in contemporary consciousness science, the search for the physiological conditions            
of consciousness played a heuristic role: the hope of early consciousness researchers was             
not only to find the physiological conditions of consciousness, but also to use physiological              
data to improve, confirm, or falsify theories of consciousness. Researchers taking part in the              
early study of consciousness were sometimes philosophers or psychologists, but they all            
shared a common interest in physiology. Henry Charlton Bastian made this very clear: 
Consciousness being the indispensable basis of all real knowledge, surely no subject can             
be more interesting than an enquiry – merely tentative though it may be – as to its nature                  
and mode of evolution, including as this does a consideration of the question as to what                
parts of our organism gave rise by their activity to this universal condition of sentiency.               
8 For more on the strategies used by early neurophysiologist to avoid metaphysical debates about the                
relation between the mind and the brain, see Chirimuuta (2017). 
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 But the subject is as difficult and as subtle as it is interesting – and is rendered all the                   
more complex because it has been so often written about by men who, though great               
philosophers and abstract thinkers, have not always possessed an adequate knowledge           
of Physiology, wherewith to test the possible truth or falsity of their theories. (...) The more                
it receives a strictly scientific treatment, starting from a basis of physiological data, the              
more hope will there be for the stability of the super-imposed theories. (Bastian, 1870,              
p.502) 
Similarly, in contemporary consciousness science, the primary role of the project that aims at              
finding neural correlates of consciousness is to help researchers devise better cognitive            
theories of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Lamme, 2010; Lau & Rosenthal,            
2011). For example, physiological data indicates that unconscious processing of sensory           
information is restricted to sensory areas, whereas conscious processing of sensory           
information is distributed throughout the cortex (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001; Fisch et al.,              
2009; Gaillard et al., 2009). Proponents of the global workspace theory of consciousness             
use this physiological data to support their cognitive theory of consciousness, namely, that             
consciousness depends on the global broadcast of information to a variety of cognitive             
modules throughout the cortex (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). 
So far, I have shown that the early scientific study of consciousness was similar to               
the current science of consciousness in three respects: first, researchers were primarily            
interested in what I called the “cognitive problem” of consciousness, rather than the             
mind/body problem, or the metaphysical problem of consciousness. Second, they used a            
metaphysically neutral language and attempted to find the physiological conditions of           
consciousness. Third, the search for the physiological conditions of consciousness also had            
the same heuristic purpose as the contemporary search for the neural correlates of             
consciousness. From these similarities between the early study of consciousness and           
contemporary consciousness science, I suggest that we may learn from the difficulties of the              
early study of consciousness to inform our contemporary practices. 
I will now provide evidence that early consciousness researchers faced the same            
obstacles as contemporary consciousness scientists, thereby motivating the claim that          
disagreement on the existence of unnoticed and unreported perception, and on the physical             
basis of consciousness, is a feature of the scientific study of consciousness throughout its              
history . In Section 3, I explain why a lack of consensus on these questions has long been a                  9
9 In the next sections, I will emphasize that early consciousness researchers disagreed on most               
issues related to consciousness. This should not obscure the fact that, throughout the 19th century, a                
“consensus practice” progressively emerged (Kitcher, 1995). That is, early consciousness scientists           
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 feature of the scientific study of consciousness by hypothesizing that the science of             
consciousness has been underdetermined by the evidence throughout its history. 
 
2. Debates in the early study of consciousness 
I provide two examples of early scientific debates on consciousness: first, on the existence              
of unnoticed and unreported perceptions and thoughts, and second, on the identification of             
the physiological conditions of consciousness. By emphasizing the similarities between          
these debates and contemporary issues in consciousness science, my goal is show that             
consciousness researchers have repeatedly failed to reach consensus on the same           
questions. 
 
2.1. What kind of consciousness? 
G. H. Lewes probably did the best job at synthesizing the variety of uses of the term                 
“consciousness” in the second half of the 19th century. He complained that “Whoever             
reflects on the numerous ambiguities and misapprehensions to which the term           
Consciousness gives rise in philosophical discussion will regret that the term cannot be             
banished altogether. But since it cannot be banished, our task must be the attempt to give it                 
precise meanings.” (Lewes, 1879, p.143). Lewes begins by noting that one acception of the              
term is “synonymous with Feeling”. He then empresses to distinguish further between feeling             
and “sentience”. Sentience is defined as a physical state which can, but needs not, give rise                
to conscious perception. For example, physiologists knew that the ​feeling associated with            
visual perception did not originate from the eye as a ​sentient organ, because, as Flourens               
remarked (1842, p.24), the eyes of decerebrated animals continued to react to light             
variations and the optic nerve continued to be excitable while the animal did not perceive               
anything. Consequently, an organism could continue to be sentient without perception. 
After defining consciousness as feeling and distinguishing feeling from sentience,          
Lewes writes that another sense of “consciousness” is to use it “synonymously with             
Cognition and with Attention. According to this view, to be affected and not to know that we                 
are affected is to be unconscious of the affection: to attend to the affection is to be conscious                  
of it” (1879, p.145). We find a similar distinction in multiple works by different authors, such                
as Thomas Laycock, who distinguished between “consciousness as feeling” and          
differed on questions that they all equally considered as meaningful with a shared commitment to               
using empirical data to answer these questions and refine their theories. 
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 “consciousness as knowledge”, which he also called “cognitional consciousness” (Laycock,          
1860, p.141); or Hamilton, who emphasized a dispute between philosophers who defined the             
term as “knowledge” and many others who “defined the term as a feeling” (Hamilton, 1836,               
vol. 1, p.191) . 10
The distinction between “consciousness as feeling” and “cognitional consciousness”         
mirrors Block’s distinction between “phenomenal consciousness” and “access        
consciousness” (Block, 1995). “Phenomenal consciousness” refers to “phenomenality”, or         
the “what it is likeness” of our experiences (Nagel, 1974), the fact that they ​feel a particular                 
way to us. “Access consciousness” refers to the fact that some representational contents are              
poised for direct use in reasoning, speech, rational action and subjective reports. Hence, it              
seems that early consciousness scientists worried about the ambiguity of the term            
“consciousness” and developed very similar distinctions 150 years before contemporary          
consciousness science . In the next section, I will show that, in the 19th century, the               11
distinction between “consciousness as feeling” and “consciousness as knowledge” led early           
consciousness researchers to disagree on the existence of unconscious thoughts and           
perceptions. I will also provide evidence that contemporary consciousness scientists still           
struggle with similar problems as a result of the distinction between phenomenal            
consciousness and access consciousness. 
 
2.2. The early overflow debate: unconscious perception and thoughts 
10 However, other authors, as James Mill, considered that the word “consciousness” was strictly              
synonymous with “feeling”: “To say I feel a sensation is merely to say I feel a feeling (...) And to say I                      
am conscious of a feeling is merely to say that I feel it.” (1869, vol. 1, p.224). Similarly, Alexander Bain                    
argues that “the knowledge or attention, although an accompaniment of the state, is not its foundation                
(...) It is most accordant with the facts, to regard Feeling as a distinct conscious element, whether                 
cognized or not, whether much or little attended to in the way of discrimination, agreement or                
memory” (Bain, 1884, 94). 
11 The distinction between these two types of consciousness also played a role similar to its                
contemporary role in early debates over the richness of consciousness (for a review of current views                
on this topic, see Cohen et al., 2016). The question was to know how many objects one could be                   
conscious of at once. Hamilton wrote: “By Charles Bonnet the mind is allowed to have a distinct notion                  
of six objects at once; by Abraham Tucker the number is limited to four; while Destutt-Tracy again                 
amplifies it to six.” (1836, p.254). These approximations are strikingly similar to our current knowledge               
of working memory limitations (e.g., Cowan, 2000). Laycock argued, however, that Hamilton’s            
observation did not “seem to meet the question” (1860, p.153). He defended that Hamilton and others                
were conflating two questions concerning the richness of consciousness. According to him, the             
question was “not how many objects you may think you see, but how many objects you can be                  
conscious of at once” (1860, p.154). On Laycock’s view, Hamilton ​thought he was able to see six                 
objects at once, but this observation didn’t answer the question of whether he was able to ​be                 
conscious​, in the sense of “consciousness as feeling”, of more than six objects at once. 
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 Due to the ambiguity of the term “consciousness” the expressions “unconscious perception”            
or “unconscious thoughts” can either mean that some thoughts or perceptions affect our             
behavior without us ​knowing that they do; or, that some thoughts or perceptions influence              
our behavior without us ​feeling​ that we have those thoughts and perceptions. 
Accordingly, one can distinguish between three different views on unconscious          
thoughts and perception in the 19th century: (1) unconscious thoughts and perceptions do             
not exist at all, in any sense of the term “conscious”, a view that I call the Cartesian view. (2)                    
Unconscious thoughts and perceptions exist ​only in the sense that we sometimes do not              
know that we have some thoughts and perceptions when we have them, although having              
those thoughts and perceptions still ​feels like something. Following a similar contemporary            
view (Block, 2007), I call this the “overflow” view. (3) Unconscious thoughts and perceptions              
exist in both senses of the term “conscious”, a view that I call the “Leibnizian view”. I now                  
provide a brief review of arguments in favor and against these views. 
Unconscious thoughts were supposed to play a role in explaining a variety of             
phenomena, among which, the association of seemingly unrelated ideas . The following           12
case, provided by Hamilton, was often discussed: 
Suppose, for instance, that A, B, C, are three thoughts, that A and C cannot immediately                
suggest each other, but that each is associated with B, so that A will naturally suggest B,                 
and B naturally suggest C. Now it may happen, that we are conscious of A, and                
immediately thereafter of C. How is the anomaly to be explained? It can only be explained                
on the principle of latent modifications. A suggests C, not immediately, but through B; but               
as B (...) does not rise into consciousness, we are apt to consider it as non-existent. (...)                 
One idea mediately suggests another into consciousness, the suggestion passing          
through one or more ideas which do not themselves rise into consciousness. (Hamilton,             
1836, p.352-353) 
To account for this kind of cases and avoid appealing to unconscious thoughts, those who               
did not accept the Leibnizian framework, such as Carpenter (1874, Chapter XIII) and John              
Stuart Mill (1865), readily admitted the existence of “unconscious ​cerebration​”. According to            
12 In his chapter on “preconscious mental activity”, Morell argues in favor of unconscious perceptions               
and thoughts by using an inference to the best explanation based on several cases that unconscious                
thoughts and perceptions are supposed to explain, among which: “After puzzling over a difficult              
problem a long time, and leaving it unsolved, we not unfrequently find, on taking it up again, that the                   
materials have rearranged themselves in our minds, so that the solution is perfectly easy. (...)               
Secondly. One idea will sometimes suggest another, which had, as far as we know, no previous                
connection with it. Thirdly. ​Habits​, when fully acquired, will come into operation, under proper              
circumstances, quite unconsciously. (...) Fourthly. Cases of this kind often occur. We write a letter and                
despatch it. Two or three days after we remember that we have made an error in the statement, or                   
spelt a word incorrectly. At the time, the error was committed unconsciously; by a latent process that                 
error is brought, perhaps, some days after, into the sphere of consciousness.” (1862, p.37). 
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 them, ​the brain could influence behavior without us knowing or feeling its influence, but the               
idea that ​the mind could do so was meaningless. For proponents of this Cartesian view, an                
idea suggested another through the influence of an unconscious cerebration, but no activity             
of an unconscious ​mind​ needed to be involved. J. S. Mill writes:  
I am myself inclined to agree with Sir W. Hamilton, and to admit his unconscious mental                
modifications, in the only shape in which I can attach any very distinct meaning to               
them––namely, unconscious modifications of the nerves (...) it may well be believed that             
the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association, those which Sir W. Hamilton              
considers as latent, really are so; that they are not even momentarily felt; the chain of                
causation being continued only physically by one organic state of the nerves succeeding             
another so rapidly that the state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not              
produced. (1865, vol. 2, p.22) 
Two main reasons led to the early demise of the unconscious cerebration view, as explained               
by Harald Höffding: 
Instead of speaking of unconscious thought or unconscious feeling, it would be safer—if             
we wish to avoid all hypotheses— to speak with Carpenter and John Stuart Mill of               
unconscious cerebration, were not this expression unsuitable, as suggesting, in the first            
place, the mistaken notion that there may be consciousness of cerebration, properly so             
called, and because, in the second place, it might appear to affirm that there is nothing at                 
all in unconscious activity related to what we know in ourselves as conscious states.              
(1891, p.81) 
First, it appeared senseless to talk about unconscious cerebrations, because cerebrations           
could never be conscious in the first place. As Lewes wrote: “We ought never to apply the                 
negative to phenomena of an order which does not admit its positive. No one, indeed, would                
think of calling a machine unconscious or a dog inhuman; but we may call a man inhuman,                 
and a sentient act unconscious.” (1879, p.151). Second, and more importantly, unconscious            
activities seemed to be ​of the same kind as conscious activities, such that talking about               
unconscious cerebrations instead of unconscious mental activities amounted to “an          
exclusion of the mind from the highest functions of the mind”, as argued by Henry Holland                
(cited in Ireland, 1875, p.380) .  13
Instead of appealing to unconscious cerebrations, some researchers opposed the          
Leibnizian view by positing ​conscious activities of the mind that were unattended,            
13 By the end of the 19th century, the expression “unconscious cerebration” disappeared. The last               
proponents of this view complained that “the expression “unconscious cerebration” is one rarely seen              
in the contemporary literature. It is hardly to be found in the indices to treatises on psychology, and                  
even Baldwin's 'Dictionary' fails to assign it a separate caption.” (A. H. Pierce, 1906). 
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 undiscriminated, or rapidly forgotten. To the best of my knowledge, Condillac was the first to               
use this strategy against the Leibnizian doctrine: 
I distinguish between two kinds of conscious perceptions: those that we remember, and             
those that we immediately forget. (…) I think that we are always conscious of the               
impressions that we receive in the soul; but, sometimes, those perceptions are so subtle              
that we forget them immediately.” (my translation, Condillac, 1743, sect. ii, §6) 
Condillac’s view, on which consciousness overflows the limits of memory, gained           
considerable influence in the 19th century . The most important proponent of the overflow             14
view was surely Lewes, according to whom “oblivescence is no proof of insentience” (1879,              
p.148): 
That we forget feelings immediately [after] they have passed is not an argument against              
their having been felt. We forget myriads of feelings, even energetic feelings, experienced             
a year ago, a week ago, an hour ago. Some which passed but a minute ago — visceral                  
sensations, sights, sounds, touches — are beyond recall. Who will say that these were              
organic states but not feelings? To be conscious of performing an act, and to be               
conscious of having performed it, are two different mental states (1879, p.166). 
A large number of philosophers and physiologists, such as François Achille Longet (1842),             
Daniel Noble (1858, p.96-97), Alfred Vulpian (1866) or William Ireland (1875) agreed.            
According to proponents of the overflow view, Leibniz’s “obscure perceptions” were           
unnoticed, undiscriminated, but nonetheless ​felt sensations . In that sense, these authors           15
thought that we could be conscious of more than we could consciously discriminate at one               
moment or could remember having been conscious the moment after. For instance, Henry             
Calderwood uses a simple example to support the view that we have more sensations than               
we can consciously discriminate: 
Let the whole ten fingers be moved over the same surface at the same moment, and we                 
fail to distinguish ten distinct sensations. The failure in discrimination does not occur             
because there are not ten distinct impressions, with ten distinct molecular changes in the              
brain, and then distinct sensations, but because we have not discriminating power            
14 For example, Hamilton (1836, p.339), Laycock (1860, p.183) and Dunn (1858, p.90) refer to               
Condillac’s view on the existence of unconscious activities of the mind. 
15 There is, however, a crucial difference between this early “overflow” debate, and the current               
overflow debate (Block, 1995; Block, 2007). The early version of this debate focused on the question                
of knowing whether unconscious perception exists or not. As such, accepting the overflow view was a                
way of denying the existence of unconscious perception. On the other hand, in the current overflow                
debate, proponents of the overflow view generally accept the existence of unconscious perception             
(e.g., Block, 2016). Instead, they distinguish between unaccessible, phenomenally conscious          
contents, and unconscious contents (which are, by definition unaccessible too). I thank an anonymous              
reviewer for drawing my attention to this difference between the early, and contemporary overflow              
debates. 
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 enough to deal with so many. In this way it happens that multitudes of impressions are                
made on the sensory nerves which are never noticed by us. The failure in this case to                 
keep the distinction sharply confirms the view that the discriminating power is quite             
distinct from that which determines the existence of the sensation. The nerve fibres can              
do more work than the discriminating power at our command can interpret. (Calderwood,             
1879, p.221). 
Early consciousness researchers posed the debate over the existence of unnoticed           
sensations in terms that were very similar to those of the contemporary overflow debate,              
initiated by Block (1995). For example, Lewes writes: 
At any given moment you are unconscious of feelings in your finger-tips and toes, nay,               
unconscious of having those parts, a momentary attention suffices to raise a vivid             
consciousness of fingers and toes. Were these feelings non-existent (...) and only called             
into existence by an increased innervation of the parts consequent on the act of              
attention? Or were they existent, but obscured by the predominance of other            
stimulations? (Lewes, 1879, p. 186).  16
He answered the question by arguing that “unless some sensation were already there,             
no effort of attention could evoke it” (p.186). Otherwise, according to Lewes, one would              
need to suppose that attention could somehow “create” sensations. This argument was            
unsuccessful because proponents of the Leibnizian view argued that, in these cases,            
attention could be directed towards ​unconscious sensations. Höffding is particularly          
clear on this: 
In like manner, when we listen in a state of abstraction to someone speaking to us, we                 
may not until long afterwards become conscious of what he has said. It is only by the                 
express direction of attention that the impressions unconsciously received are here raised            
above “the threshold.” That we are able to remember something is therefore no decisive              
proof that we consciously apprehended it at the time of its occurrence. By connection with               
that which has been consciously apprehended, even an unconscious impression may be            
called to memory. (Höffding, 1881, p.76) 
Other authors such as Hamilton (1836), or Bastian (1869, 1870a), straightforwardly rejected            
the distinction between consciousness as feeling and consciousness as knowledge, by           
arguing that consciousness always involves cognition. On Bastian’s view, we cannot attend            
to a sensation without ​knowing that we have that sensation or at least knowing that the                
sensation has a particular quality. If we ignored everything concerning our sensations, we             
would have no reason to attend to them. Hence, to the extent that unnoticed sensations are                
16 Compare this with Schwitzgebel’s question “Do you have constant tactical experience of your feet in 
your shoes? Or is experience limited to what’s in attention?” (2007). 
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 available for attention, they must somehow be ​known to have particular qualities. For this              
reason, Bastian argues: 
Mr. Bain stops short of the truth when he says “the lowest or more restricted forms of                 
sensation does not contain any element of knowledge.” It does not contain knowledge, it              
is true, in its highest sense, involving affirmation and belief, but as a state of               
consciousness, it is inseparable from knowledge in its essence, which implies           
discrimination of difference or agreement​. We, in common with others, would rather            
believe that no sensation, not even the simplest, can exist without the element of              
cognition being at the same time present in consciousness. (Bastian, 1869, p.214)  17
The problem with the overflow view, according to Bastian, is that  
any sensation, however simple, can only be recognised as such––can only be revealed in              
consciousness––inasmuch as it represents a certain quality or qualities, by which it can             
be differentiated from or classed with previous states of feeling. Therefore even the most              
simple sensation does necessitate the existence of intellectual activity, since          
discrimination is the most fundamental mode of intellect. (p.214) 
According to Bastian, for a sensation to have the quality that it has, one needs to be able to                   
discriminate ​that sensation from other sensations. On his view, the capacity to discriminate             
between different sensations requires some ​knowledge of those sensations. Hence, every           
conscious sensation must somehow be known, for, otherwise, the sensation would not have             
the particular quality that it has. And if sensations must be known to have the particular                
qualities that they have, consciousness as feeling requires consciousness as knowledge.           
Consequently, consciousness as feeling cannot “overflow” the limits of consciousness as           
knowledge. 
It seems that Lewes had anticipated this argument, however. He notes that “the term              
Cognition is ambiguous” (Lewes, 1879, p.183). By the idea that consciousness involves            
cognition, one could mean either that when one is conscious of something, there is “a               
recognition by the Ego of its own operations”; or that “consciousness [is] discriminated             
feeling”. Lewes thought that the only sense in which cognition was relevant to consciousness              
was in the latter sense of the term. He agreed that consciousness involved cognition, in the                
sense that it required some capacities to discriminate sensations. However, he refused the             
claim that consciousness involved the ​recognition of oneself as discriminating sensations.           
Hence, according to Lewes, one can have ​conscious ​sensations, which result from            
operations of cognitive capacities, ​without ​knowing that one is currently exerting these            
cognitive capacities or has these sensations. By making the distinction between cognition at             
17 For the record, this article appeared in the very first volume of the journal ​Nature​, in 1869. 
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 a sub-personal level (the discriminations involved in sensations), and cognition at a personal             
level (the recognition by the Ego of its operations), Lewes escaped the conclusion that              
consciousness as feeling should be reduced to consciousness as knowledge. 
Considering that all participants in this debate were empirically minded, one natural            
way of settling the problem could have been to appeal to empirical results demonstrating              
unconscious perception. Gustav Fechner was probably the first researcher attempting to           
provide empirical evidence of unconscious perception. He reported a number of cases in             
which unseen objects could give rise to after-images (Fechner, 1860) . According to him, if              18
unseen objects could have conscious ​effects​, it necessarily meant that they were seen             
unconsciously (Romand, 2012). Fechner’s inquiries later influenced the first real experiments           
attempting to demonstrate unconscious perception, most notably Peirce and Jastrow’s          
experiment (1884). However, even if researchers were aware of these experiments, they            
probably wouldn’t have settled the matter. Indeed, it seems that Peirce and Jastrow             
interpreted their finding that subjects (i.e., themselves) could make sensory discriminations           
without knowledge of making these discriminations correctly, as indicating that some           
differences in sensations could fail to elicit ​a sensation of difference . Nonetheless, they             19
note that a failure to have a sensation of difference does not necessarily mean that there                
was no actual difference in conscious sensations. Peirce and Jastrow insist that their result              
indicates that there is no least perceptible difference in sensations, as supposed by Fechner,              
but only perceptible differences in sensations that fail to elicit sensations of differences. As              
such, researchers could have interpreted Peirce & Jastrow’s early experiment in various            
ways, and proponents of the overflow view wouldn’t have been convinced that this             
experiment could demonstrate unconscious perception. 
Given the disagreements just exposed, it is safe to say that, by the end of the 19th                 
century, the debate over the existence of unconscious perception was still unsolved. My aim              
is not to provide a complete analysis of the discussion over unconscious thoughts and              
perception in the 19th century, but only to provide an overview of the debate to justify that a                  
18 To the best of my knowledge, the only researcher taking this case into account was Höffding:                 
“Fechner relates (​Elements of Psychophysics​, Vol. ii, p. 432), that one morning in bed he was                
surprised by having a white image of the stove-pipe when he closed his eyes. As he lay with his eyes                    
open and speculated, he had seen before him, without being conscious of it, a black stove-pipe with a                  
white wall as background, and what now made its appearance was the negative after-image of this.                
The physical excitation had thus been of such a nature that the visual sensation ​might have arisen;                 
but the attention being otherwise engaged, what appeared to consciousness was not the sensation              
itself, but only the more impressive after-image” (1891, p.384). 
19 Peirce and Jastrow write that “the quantity which we have called the degree of confidence was                 
probably the secondary sensation of a difference between the primary sensations compared.” (1884,             
p.82). 
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 comparison between problems faced by early consciousness researchers and those of           
contemporary consciousness scientists is meaningful. 
Today, most researchers accept the existence of unconscious perception. Peters &           
Lau (2015) found that cognitive scientists who participated in a survey on unconscious             
perception “reported believing that subliminal processing exists (94%)”. However, they also           
found, in the same survey, that only 36% of participants believed that the existence of               
unconscious perception had been unequivocally demonstrated in the empirical literature.          
Although scientists have developed a wide variety of empirical methods for assessing            
unconscious perception, debates over the existence of unconscious perception continue          
(e.g., Peters et al., 2017). Similarly, the overflow debate, revived by Block in the 1990s,               
remains unsettled. It seems that most researchers recognize that solving this puzzle is first              
and foremost a methodological and conceptual challenge rather than a matter of acquiring             
more data. For instance, in a review of the current methods used to address the question of                 
whether phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive access, Phillips (2018) concludes         
that “given our present data and methods, not only do we not know whether consciousness               
requires cognition, we do not know how to find out” (p.7). Hence, it seems that, after 150                 
years, no consensus has been reached on very similar problems, namely, on the existence              
of unconscious perception and on whether there can be unnoticed, unremembered or            
unreportable perception. I conclude that lack of consensus on these problems is a feature of               
the study of consciousness which, accordingly, calls for an explanation. 
Some researchers have argued that physiological data could help solving this debate            
(Lamme, 2010; Block, 2007). As it turns out, physiologists of the 19th century thought so too,                
but the problem still couldn’t be solved. In the next section, I provide an overview of the                 
debate on the physiological conditions of consciousness. 
 
2.3. The physiological conditions of consciousness 
Psycho-physiologists of the 19th century could not snap colored pictures of the brain with              
functional MRIs. However, they could lesion, decerebrate and decapitate many non-human           
vertebrates, and see what happens in each case. Unfortunately for the animal kingdom,             
that’s what they did.  20
20 Early consciousness scientists, and chief among them, David Ferrier, were targeted by             
anti-vivisectionist groups for both ethical and religious reasons (Finn & Stark, 2015). Indeed, the              
anti-vivisectionist movement was as much concerned by animal suffering as by the “cold, proud,              
atheistic spirit that distinguishes modern investigators” (Clarke, 1888). Ferrier’s investigations on           
localization of brain functions, and the research of the early study of consciousness, were perceived               
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 Pflüger’s experiments on decapitated frogs will provide a useful starting point for our             
discussion, as these experiments signed the beginning of a debate that would occupy             
consciousness scientists for fifty years (Pflüger, 1853; Klein, 2017). Here is the case of the               
decapitated frog, as described by Ferrier: 
When a drop of acetic acid is placed on the thigh of a decapitated frog, the foot of the                   
same side is raised, and attempts made with it to rub the part. On the foot being                 
amputated, and the acid applied as before, the animal makes a similar attempt, but failing               
to reach the point of irritation with the stump, after a few moments of apparent indecision                
and agitation, raises the other foot, and attempts with it to remove the irritant. (Ferrier               
(1876), p.20) 
Klein (2017) provides two additional historical cases with decapitated frogs: 
a brainless frog will swim if dropped in water (Lewes 1877, 190). If completely              
submerged, it will swim to the surface. And not only that; if one impedes the emerging,                
pithed frog by putting an inverted jar in its path, the frog will not easily be trapped. It will                   
actually re-descend until it can swim out of the jar, and then will swim up to the surface                  
(Goltz 1869, 70). This is an astonishing sequence of behaviours for an animal that lacks a                
brain. (Klein, 2017, p.7). 
Now, here is the vexing question that caused so much debate throughout the 19th century: 
What is the nature of the impression which is the immediate antecedent of this responsive               
activity? Is it a purely physical phenomenon, or has it likewise a subjective side? In other                
words, are these actions merely reflex or excito-motor, or are they the result of sensation               
properly so-called? If we define sensation as the consciousness of an impression, it will              
be seen that the problem to be solved is, whether consciousness is an accompaniment of               
the activity of these centres (Ferrier, 1876, p.40) 
There are three main kinds of responses to this question (summarized in Figure 1): first, one                
can argue that consciousness “accompanies” the activity of the spinal cord. Lewes (1873,             
1879), Herzen (1886), Pflüger (1853), Foster (1890), and Schiff (1858) supported this view.             
Second, other researchers defended that consciousness accompanies the activity of the           
midbrain or the thalamus, such that ​decorticated (i.e., without a cortex) animals are             
conscious, but not decapitated animals. Carpenter (1874), Dunn (1858), Vulpian (1866),           
Longet (1842) and Noble (1858) defended this view. Third, some claimed that the cerebral              
cortex was necessary for consciousness, such that neither decorticated or decapitated           
as providing support for materialist views of the mind. After the passage of the 1876 Cruelty to Animal                  
Act, anti-vivisectionsts prosecuted Ferrier in 1881. The prosecution failed and Ferrier received            
important support from the scientific community, emphasizing that Ferrier’s work was crucial for             
developing surgery using his functional maps of the brain. 
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 animals were conscious. Flourens (1842), Bastian (1870), Ferrier (1876), and Maudsley           
(1867) championed this view . 21
 
Figure 1. Summary of the variety of views on the physiological conditions of consciousness. 
I now review several arguments and counterarguments for each of these views, beginning             
with arguments in favor of the spinal view. First, it is important to note that the type of                  
sensations elicited in the spinal cord are nothing like the sensations we usually have. Lewes               
writes: 
In saying that the Spinal Cord is ​a seat of sensation, it is not meant that it is ​the seat, nor                     
that the sensations are ​specifically like the sensations of colour, of sound, of taste, of               
smell; but they are as like these as each of these is like the other. (1873, p.84) 
Despite being different from ordinary sensations, they are sensations nonetheless.          
Moreover, these sensations are supposed to be extremely transient, as Foster writes:  
we may thus infer that when the brainless frog is stirred by some stimulus to a reflex act,                  
the spinal cord is lit up by a momentary flash of consciousness coming out of darkness                
and dying away into darkness again (1890, p.912). 
21 There are important differences between all these authors, even when I classified them in the same                 
category (Figure 1). For example, Carpenter thought that the midbrain was the only seat of               
consciousness, while Vulpian and Maudsley believed that activity in the midbrain or the cortex could               
be sufficient for consciousness. Similarly, Dunn and Todd disagreed with Noble on whether the              
activity of the striatum could be sufficient for experiencing emotional sensations. Finally, at some              
points Maudsley seemed to accept that the activity of the midbrain could be sufficient for               
consciousness, particularly in “lower animals”, while Ferrier was categorical on the fact that             
consciousness depended only on the activity of the cortex. Nonetheless, despite these differences, I              
believe that the present taxonomy is broadly representative. 
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 Now, there are three main arguments in favor of the spinal view. First, researchers generally               
admitted that complex behaviors involving adaptation to unusual situations require          
consciousness. Behaviors of decapitated animals are well-adapted and complex. Therefore,          
the spinal cord is sufficient for consciousness (Pflüger, 1853). Second, Lewes (1873) argues             
that nerve tissues in the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata or midbrain are not               
fundamentally different. If tissues are not radically different, and if mental properties result             
from properties of the tissues, then mental properties are not fundamentally different            
between the spinal cord and the midbrain. Hence, if one acknowledges that the midbrain can               
generate conscious experiences, one must accept the same conclusion for the spinal cord.             
Third, Herzen (1886) remarks that decerebrated animals continue to react to nociceptive            
stimuli just as non-decerebrated animals. These “pain-like behaviors” are the only objective            
signs on which we can rationally base our attributions of pain in typical cases. Consequently,               
Herzen argues, based on the observation of the same pain-like behavior, it is irrational to               
attribute pain experiences to non-decerebrated animals while refusing to assign pain           
experiences to decerebrated animals. If pain-like behaviors count as evidence for pain            
experiences in the former case, it should also be the case in the latter. Hence, one must                 
conclude that the spinal cord and the midbrain are sufficient for consciousness, at least in               
the case of pain experiences . 22
To the first argument, proponents of the midbrain-thalamus and cortex views           
responded that we are not typically conscious of reflex actions elicited in the spinal cord, and                
these actions are not usually under rational control. Consequently, it seemed that all that              
was proved by the complexity of behaviors in decapitated animals was that the spinal cord               
could be sufficient for complex behaviors, but not sufficient for consciousness. After all,             
Carpenter and others had already shown that a wide variety of complex and seemingly              
goal-directed behaviors could happen unconsciously, as in the case of eye movements for             
example (Carpenter, 1874).  
To the second argument, one could respond that many behaviors which probably            
recruited the cerebral hemispheres were ​not conscious (Bastian, 1870), thus proving that            
activity of “nerve tissues” was probably not sufficient for consciousness. Moreover, following            
Flourens (1842), Carpenter had shown that an operation could ablate the cerebellum or a              
disease destroy it without any loss in “sensorial capacity” (Carpenter, 1864). If ablation of the               
cerebellum did not modify consciousness, then consciousness had to be elicited by a             
22 Very similar arguments have recently been developed in defense of the existence of pain               
experiences in fish (See, e.g., Tye (2017), and Michel (2018) for a critical analysis of these                
arguments). 
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 specific kind of activity of “nerve tissues” and not by ​any kind of nervous activity, as                
supposed by Lewes.  
To the third argument, it could be answered, following Goltz’s experiments (1869), that             
decapitated frogs lacked some of the pain-like behaviors that they would have had if they               
had pain experiences, as did non-decapitated frogs. Indeed, Goltz discovered that brainless            
frogs placed in water, the temperature of which is slowly raised, do not manifest any pain.                
Opponents to the spinal view used this experiment to argue that, if a frog’s spinal cord were                 
able to feel pain, the frog should have reacted to the painful increase in temperature.               
Instead, brainless frogs did not exhibit any pain-like behaviors in this situation. 
Despite these arguments, proponents of the spinal view maintained that activity in the             
spinal cord could be sufficient for consciousness. After all, they could counter the existence              
of unconscious reflex actions elicited in the spinal cord by arguing that these actions are               
typically accompanied by faint sensations that are unremembered or unattended. Moreover,           
against Goltz’ experiment, Foster (cited in Lewes, 1873) reports that if a decapitated frog has               
its leg in water while the temperature is gradually raised, it will withdraw its leg. Lewes                
concludes that “The depressing influence of heat on the Spinal Cord destroys its reflect              
powers” (1873, p.84), he continues:  
It proves, to my mind, that although the frog remains motionless in the heater water and                
shows no sign of pain from the stimulus of heat, this is assuredly not because Sensibility                
in general is gone, but simply because Sensibility to temperature is gone. (​p.84​) 
It seems that, by the end of the 19th century, although the view that the spinal cord acted                  
only automatically became the consensus view among physiologists , no ​decisive argument           23
had been given against the spinal view. Boring retrospectively concluded that “there could             
be no clear decision between Pflüger, who said that the reflexes of the cord should be                
conscious, and Lotze, who said they were not” (Boring, 1950, p.666). 
On the other side of the theoretical spectrum, opponents to the spinal view also              
disagreed on the physiological conditions of consciousness. I identify three main arguments            
in favor of the midbrain-thalamus view. First, animals without their cerebral cortices could             
present complex behaviors. Second, invertebrate animals do not have a cerebral cortex but             
can perform what seem to be conscious actions (Carpenter, 1874). Third, the midbrain or the               
thalamus seem ideally suited to integrate information from all the senses to constitute one              
unified conscious experience because they receive afferent nerves from the sense organs            
(Dunn, 1858; Noble, 1858).  
23 See Liddell (1960) on the history of the discovery of reflex actions. 
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 Proponents of the midbrain-thalamus view thought that the cortex might be sufficient            
for consciousness, especially consciousness of abstract thoughts or complex perception, but           
conscious ​sensations resulted mainly from the activity of the midbrain or thalamus .            24
Accordingly, the role of the hemispheres was to “intellectually develop sensations” and            
“transform them into ideas” (my translation, Vulpian, 1866, p.672). In other words, the             
cerebral cortex was responsible for access consciousness, and consciousness of thoughts,           
but was not responsible for “consciousness as feeling”. 
David Ferrier begged to differ . He remarked, first, that the supporters of the             25
midbrain-thalamus view accepted that consciousness did not arise in the spinal cord,            
although the spinal cord could produce complex and adapted behaviors in decapitated            
animals. Warning us to avoid relying “on appearances alone”, he writes: 
the mere faculty of adaptation is not necessarily a proof of consciousness, for, as we               
have seen, it exists in some degree in the spinal cord, and if it is not regarded as proof of                    
conscious action on the part of the cord, neither can it be taken as such here; for it may                   
be that the more complex adaptation manifested by the mesencephale is simply the result              
of more complex and special afferent and efferent relations. (p.43) 
Based on this argument, either the midbrain-thalamus view had to collapse into the spinal              
view, or proponents of the mibrain-thalamus view had to provide evidence that there was a               
difference in kind, and not in degrees, between activity in the spinal cord and the midbrain.                
As argued by Carpenter, such evidence could come from the “evidently conscious actions of              
invertebrate animals” (1876, p.44), which do not possess a cortex. Nevertheless, Ferrier            
responded that  
the ganglia of the invertebrates are not completely homologous with the mesencephalic            
ganglia of vertebrates, for if they were so, we should expect that not merely sensation,               
but also the other psychical faculties, should be manifested by vertebrates deprived of             
their cerebral hemispheres, even though to a less degree. But it is not a difference in                
degree only which is observed, but a manifest difference in kind. It is probable, therefore,               
24 At some points Carpenter (1874) seems to defend the view that ​all thoughts originate under the                 
form of unconscious cerebrations, and are thus unconscious, until these thoughts are somehow             
transferred to the midbrain where they can evoke sensations and become conscious. In that respect,               
Carpenter’s view might have been similar to the contemporary view held by Carruthers (2015),              
according to which all thoughts are unconscious because consciousness is “sensory-based”. 
25 Ferrier received the ideal training for participating in the early science of consciousness: he was                
Alexander Bain’s student, and also studied in Wundt and Helmholtz’ laboratories. Later, he worked at               
the same hospital as Hughlings Jackson, who became a friend and mentor (Pearce, 2003). It is no                 
surprise then, that Ferrier became a fellow of the royal society at the age of 33. His first book, ​The                    
Functions of the Brain (1876), is one of the greatest achievements of early neurophysiology, and               
contains some of the best examples of the scientific rigor of the early scientific study of                
consciousness. 
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 that in the ganglia of the invertebrates there are nerve cells which perform, in however               
lowly a manner, the functions of the cerebral hemispheres in vertebrates. (1876, p.44) 
In other words, Ferrier agreed that invertebrate animals are conscious. However, he argued             
that one could not conclude anything on consciousness in decorticated animals from this, for              
the mesencephalic structures in humans should not be considered analogous to the brain of              
invertebrates . 26
Probably the most convincing of Ferrier’s arguments against both the          
midbrain-thalamus and spinal views came from experiments in animals, but also from clinical             
studies in humans: 
we have experiments of disease which practically detach the hemispheres from their            
mesencephalic connections, and leave thought and speech intact, so that we can obtain             
direct testimony as regards the consciousness of impressions. Such an experiment is            
performed by a lesion of the crus cerebri or of the posterior part of the peduncular                
expansion (...), phenomena not unfrequently occurring in clinical experience. When this           
occurs, the individual has absolutely no consciousness of tactile impressions made on the             
opposite side of his body, ​however much he may strain his attention to receive them​. In                
the mesencephale alone, therefore, sensory impressions are not correlated with          
modifications of consciousness; whence we must conclude that sensation is a function of             
the higher centres. (Ferrier, 1876, p.45) 
If the midbrain were ​sufficient for consciousness, one would predict that sectioning the             
connection between the cortex and the midbrain would not affect consciousness. Ferrier            
remarked that this is not what happens, both in patients with lesions and when the section is                 
experimentally performed in animals. Rather, it seems that subjects are not conscious of             
tactile sensations, because impressions are not transmitted from the unconscious midbrain           
to the cortex where they are transformed into conscious sensations. 
Finally, Ferrier was also well known for following Fritsch and Hitzig’s experiments            
(1870) on electrical stimulations of the brain to discover the specific functions carried out by               
various brain areas, and applied these methods to identify the physiological conditions of             
consciousness. Among other observations, he did not find any specific modifications of            
behavior by stimulating the optic thalamus, but he remarked that stimulation of the angular              
26 Bastian had a similar response (1870), although a bit more complex, based on Spencer’s               
evolutionary reasoning applied to psychology (Spencer, 1868). Bastian thought that, as they develop             
throughout evolution, activities of cerebral mechanisms become automatic and unconscious.          
Accordingly, the activity of the brain of invertebrates could be conscious, while, in the course of                
human evolution, activity in the human midbrain progressively became automatic and unconscious,            
leaving conscious activity to the newly acquired cerebral cortex. 
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 gyrus could cause “confusion in vision” (Ferrier, 1875, p.425) . Ferrier’s innovative           27
experimental techniques yielded new arguments in favor of the cortex view: vision could be              
modified by electrical stimulation of the cortex, independently from the midbrain or the             
thalamus. 
Despite Ferrier’s genius, early consciousness researchers could not uncontroversially         
identify the physiological conditions of consciousness. His work on electrical stimulation was            
criticized by Lewes, arguing that there was no proof that the electrical current stimulated the               
cortex instead of merely passing ​through the cortex (Lewes, 1876, p.74). Moreover, the             
argument according to which the spinal cord is unconscious because subjects lose tactile             
sensations when a lesion separates the spinal cord from the brain had already been              
answered by Schiff (1858), who argued that, in these cases, consciousness was split, such              
that there could be one consciousness in the spinal cord and another in the brain. 
Since the early study of consciousness, contemporary consciousness scientists have          
not reached consensus on these questions, and they still hold, with variations, the different              
views represented in the 19th century. Some philosophers and consciousness scientists           
hold panpsychist or almost-panpsychist views, according to which a wide variety of entities             
that we do not usually consider conscious, such as, for instance, sets of inactive logic gates,                
are conscious (Aaronson 2014a,b; Chalmers, 1996; Tononi & Koch, 2015). The midbrain            
view is still held by Merker, who argues that neural activity in subcortical structures of the                
brain is sufficient for consciousness (Merker, 2007). The local recurrency theory of            
consciousness is also quite similar to the midbrain-thalamus view, in that its proponents             
highlight the difference between conscious sensations and conscious access to these           
sensations, leading them to hypothesize the existence of consciousness in “sensory           
modules” (Block, 2007; Lamme, 2015). Finally, others believe that consciousness is           
dependent upon the activity of the prefrontal cortex, either to globally broadcast contents             
throughout the brain (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), or to create higher-order representations            
(Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) (on this issue, see also Odegaard et al., 2018; Michel & Morales,                
forthcoming). The fact that some theories on which a wide variety of entities are conscious               
can co-exist with theories on which only some cognitive mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex              
27 Ferrier’s identification of the parietal cortex as the seat of vision was wrong. The localization of the                  
area of vision led to a controversy between Ferrier and Munk (Fishman, 1995; Glickstein, 1985). The                
debate was quite tense, to the point that James wrote: “'the quarrel is very acrimonious; indeed the                 
subject of localization of functions in the brain seems to have a peculiar effect on the temper of those                   
who cultivate it experimentally (...) Munk's absolute tone about his observations and his theoretical              
arrogance have led to his ruin as an authority” (James, 1890, p.46). Despite being impolite, Munk was                 
right: the occipital cortex is the seat of vision. 
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 generate consciousness is surely the sign of an absence of consensus on the neural              
correlates of consciousness. 
Following the brief historical review of the search for the physiological conditions of             
consciousness, and considering contemporary disagreements on the neural correlates of          
consciousness, I conclude that lack of consensus on the physical basis of consciousness is              
a long-standing feature of the scientific study of consciousness. Accordingly, as in the case              
of the overflow debate, this long-standing disagreement in the study of consciousness calls             
for an explanation. 
 
3. Consciousness science underdetermined 
It seems that both the overflow debate and the debate over the physical basis of               
consciousness have been going on for a while, at least since the 19th century, with little                
success in settling both of these debates. As such, I have argued that lack of consensus on                 
these problems has been a feature of the study of consciousness throughout its history.  
I now hypothesize that the underdetermination of theories of consciousness could be a             
reasonable explanation of persistent disagreement in the scientific study of consciousness           
on these problems. After providing support for the hypothesis that the science of             
consciousness could be underdetermined, I will argue that underdetermination could be           
particularly problematic and persistent in the case of consciousness science, thereby           
explaining why underdetermination has not disappeared after all those years. 
 
3.1. Theories of consciousness are preserved come what may 
A popular view in philosophy of science is that scientific hypotheses are not tested in a                
vacuum but within a web of other hypotheses (Duhem, 1962). From this, it follows that a                
failed prediction leaves open the possibility of rejecting either the hypothesis that one wanted              
to test or some other background hypotheses. For example, to test a scientific hypothesis              
which makes a specific prediction about the temperature of my cup of coffee, I need to hold                 
some beliefs about the reliability of my thermometer. Now, if my prediction fails, I could reject                
either the hypothesis that I wanted to test or the background hypothesis that my              
thermometer is reliable. What I should do in this case is ​underdetermined by the evidence               
(Stanford, 2017; Turnbull, 2018). 
In consciousness science, theories of consciousness make predictions about what          
should or should not happen in certain conditions. For example, Lewes’ theory of             
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 consciousness makes the empirical prediction that subjects will continue to have tactile            
experiences when their midbrain is separated from their cortex, while Ferrier argues that it              
should not be the case. This prediction is made with the background hypothesis that              
subjects can typically report having subjective experiences when they have them. As seen in              
Section 2.3, when one sections the connection between the midbrain and the hemispheres,             
subjects do not report having any tactile experiences. Instead of rejecting his hypothesis,             
Lewes could reject the background belief that subjects can typically report having subjective             
experiences when they have them and argue that the case described by Ferrier is a case of                 
consciousness without the possibility to report. Similarly, we saw that Fechner predicts that             
conscious after-images can be elicited by unseen objects, while Vulpian or Ireland make the              
opposite prediction. When Fechner reports a case in which an unnoticed object causes an              
afterimage, Ireland can simply reject the hypothesis that subjects typically remember what            
they consciously see, and argue that the object was actually consciously seen, but             
immediately forgotten, such that it created the illusion that the object was not seen. In these                
cases, scientists reject background hypotheses to save their preferred views of           
consciousness from being falsified. 
Underdetermination was an important problem in the early study of consciousness.           
We also have reasons to believe that underdetermination is just as pervasive in the              
contemporary science of consciousness. Here, I provide just two telling examples of            
underdetermination in contemporary consciousness science: 
First, Aaronson (2014a,b) provided (what he thought was) a decisive argument           
against the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness, destined to show that,            
according to the theory, a set of inactive logic gates can be conscious. But there is more: he                  
demonstrated that, according to IIT, a set of inactive logic gates could have an arbitrarily               
high level of consciousness, provided that it is large enough. As a response, proponents of               
IIT accepted Aaronson’s counterintuitive conclusion that a set of inactive logic gates could             
be conscious (Tononi, 2014). Accepting that sets of inactive logic gates are conscious, of              
course, seems to violate a large number of background hypotheses. IIT could be saved from               
Aaronson’s challenge precisely because there was the possibility, for proponents of IIT, of             
rejecting one or several background hypotheses rather than the core of the theory. As such,               
proponents of IIT can continue to support the view that the physical basis of consciousness               
is the integration of information. 
Second, in the debate over the existence of conscious feelings in fish, opponents of              
the existence of consciousness in fish argue that fish cannot be conscious, since they do not                
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 have a cortex, and a cortex is necessary for having conscious experiences (Rose, 2014;              
Key, 2015, 2016). On the other hand, proponents of the existence of consciousness in fish               
have shown the existence of a wide variety of behaviors typically considered to be related to                
consciousness in these animals. For example, fish attempt to avoid stimuli that could             
damage their bodies, and these responses are reduced when fish are administered            
analgesics (Sneddon et al. 2003). Similarly, fish injected with harmful chemicals will move             
from enriched environments to barren tanks if the latter are filled with analgesics, thus              
indicating that fish search to relieve the pain (Sneddon 2011). The fact that fish exhibit these                
behaviors is thought to reinforce the view that fish have conscious experiences, at least              
conscious experiences of pain (see, e.g., Tye, 2017). In order to preserve the hypothesis              
that a cortex is ​necessary for the existence of conscious experiences, opponents to the              
existence of consciousness in fish reject the background hypothesis that pain-relieving           
behaviors indicate the presence of conscious experiences (for a review of this debate, see              
Michel, 2018).  
The list of rejected background hypotheses in the study of consciousness could go             
on and on. To some extent, the short history of the study of consciousness I provided is just                  
the story of background hypotheses rejected by consciousness scientists to save their            
preferred views of consciousness. To put it bluntly: if you don’t like an empirical result               
suggesting that an entity is unconscious when your theory says that it should be conscious,               
there is always a way of arguing that this entity, which does not seem conscious, is in fact                  
conscious, by rejecting some background hypotheses. Quine’s claim that hypotheses can be            
preserved “come what may” seems especially well adapted to the study of consciousness             
(Quine, 1951). That theories of consciousness can be saved “come what may” might come              
from the fact that, in a sense, no hypothesis is held sacred in consciousness science .               28
Indeed, the history of the study of consciousness seems to indicate that no background              
hypothesis is too precious to reject: the hypothesis that systems that perform no interesting              
functions are unconscious, the hypothesis that conscious organisms know when they have            
experiences, or even the hypothesis that consciousness cannot be split when the brain is              
sectioned from the spinal cord. The problem is that, if no hypothesis is too costly to reject,                 
everything is permitted: there is always a way of saving one’s preferred theory.             
Consequently, I believe that the hypothesis according to which the science of consciousness             
has long been underdetermined by the evidence could provide a unifying explanation of the              
long-standing disagreement on both the identification of the physical bases of consciousness            
and the overflow debate. 
28 Even the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness exists (see, e.g., Frankish, 2016). 
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 Nevertheless, one could argue that scientific underdetermination is typically ​transient,          
because all responses to disconfirming evidence are typically not equally rational or            
supported by the evidence, or, at least, rarely remain so over long periods of time (Laudan,                
1990; Laudan & Leplin, 1991). As such, it could seem implausible that underdetermination             
has persisted in the study of consciousness for more than 150 years. Moreover, this              
argument could also support the claim that, although underdetermination has been           
persistent in the history of the study of consciousness, there is no reason for thinking that it                 
will persist in the future. If so, underdetermination in the study of consciousness would not               
be particularly problematic. I answer this argument in the last section by providing some              
reasons for thinking that underdetermination in the science of consciousness might be a             
persistent phenomenon. 
 
3.2. Problems with detection rules 
I now hypothesize that the reason why consciousness science could have remained            
underdetermined over such a long period of time is that consciousness scientists often             
disagree on what I call “detection rules”. Here are several examples of detection rules:              
“subjects can typically report what they are conscious of”, “when subjects are conscious,             
they know that they are”, “when subjects are confident that they perceive something, they              
have a conscious perception of that thing”. In consciousness science, detection procedures,            
that is, the type of procedures by which scientists produce judgments on the subjects’              
consciousness or unconsciousness of some contents during their experiments, use          
detection rules. For example, if a scientist makes use of a detection procedure relying on               
subjective reports to judge that a subject is conscious of a stimulus, her detection procedure               
is using the detection rule: “subjects can typically report what they are conscious of”.  
Not all detection procedures are created equal, because detection procedures use           
different detection rules. For instance, a detection procedure using the rule that subjects are              
conscious of a stimulus if their pupil reacts to the stimulus might not be as good as a                  
detection procedure using the rule that subjects are conscious of a stimulus when they can               
report being conscious of it. Some detection rules seem more ​reliable than others. Here, I               
will consider that a detection rule is reliable if a detection procedure using that rule has a                 
disposition to produce a large proportion of true judgments about the presence or absence of               
consciousness (of something) in a subject. 
Detection rules have a special role in consciousness science, because one must rely             
on detection procedures to test hypotheses about consciousness. Indeed, theories of           
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 consciousness typically make predictions about whether subjects are conscious or          
unconscious of contents in certain situations. For example, the global workspace theory            
predicts that, if a subject does not attend to an object in a crowded setting, she will be                  
unconscious of that object (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). One cannot verify whether the             
subject is conscious or unconscious of the stimulus in this situation without being able to               
detect the presence or absence of consciousness of a stimulus in that subject. Hence, when               
scientists test their hypotheses, they typically do so by relying on detection procedures using              
detection rules. As such, detection rules can be viewed as tools connecting empirical facts              
with hypotheses about consciousness. For example, Ferrier tested whether subjects would           
still be conscious of tactile sensations when a lesion separates the spinal cord from the               
brain. He observed that, in these conditions, patients claim that they do not have tactile               
sensations. Here, a patient’s claim that she does not have tactile sensations can bear on               
Ferrier’s hypothesis about the patient’s ​consciousness of those sensations only if Ferrier            
uses a detection rule connecting subjective reports of having no sensations with the             
subject’s (un)consciousness of those sensations. Such a detection rule could be: “when            
subjects report having no conscious experiences, they do not have conscious experiences”.            
This example illustrates that, without detection rules, empirical facts remain silent about the             
subjects’ consciousness. Hence, scientists must typically use detection rules when they test            
hypotheses about consciousness. 
The problem is that, if detection rules are typically involved when scientists test             
hypotheses about consciousness, it is also typically possible for scientists to reject certain             
interpretations of the results by rejecting the detection rules used to test these hypotheses.              
In the case of Ferrier’s experiment just mentioned, proponents of the spinal view could claim,               
and ​did claim, that the rule “when subjects claim that they do not have conscious               
experiences, they do not have conscious experiences” is unreliable. That is, they claimed             
that detection procedures using that detection rule fail to detect the presence or absence of               
consciousness, at least in that specific case. Consequently, because they rejected the            
detection rule used by Ferrier, proponents of the spinal view could reject his interpretation of               
the results and save their preferred hypothesis, namely, that the spinal cord could still elicit               
unreported conscious tactile experiences. Hence, in consciousness science, it is typically           
possible to save one’s preferred hypothesis in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence by             
rejecting the detection rule used to test it. Consequently, the systematic possibility of             
rejecting detection rules is a ​prevalent factor of underdetermination in consciousness           
science. 
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 Nevertheless, the systematic possibility of rejecting detection rules, by itself, does not            
explain why underdetermination is persistent throughout the history of the study of            
consciousness. Indeed, I have suggested that scientific underdetermination is usually          
transient because all responses to disconfirming evidence are typically not equally rational.            
To put it bluntly: there are ​cheap and ​costly ways of saving hypotheses. Remember the               
thermometer example: if, on the basis of some hypothesis, I predict that the temperature of a                
certain object should be of exactly 20°C, and it turns out that my thermometer indicates               
18°C, I can either reject my hypothesis, or save my hypothesis by claiming that the               
measurement procedure relying on a thermometer is unreliable. Presumably, if I don’t have             
any independent reasons to doubt that the measurement procedure is reliable, and if I can               
use a wide variety of thermometers, all indicating 18°C, the most rational thing to do is to                 
reject my hypothesis. Indeed, in that case, rejecting the reliability of all measurement             
procedures using thermometers would be extremely ​costly​, because a wide variety of            
theories and everyday practices depend on the reliability of these procedures. On the other              
hand, if I had good reasons to believe that measurement procedures using thermometers             
are often unreliable, saving my hypothesis by rejecting the reliability of these procedures             
would be cheap. 
I have shown that disagreement over which detection rules to use is quite common in               
consciousness science throughout its history. For example, in the overflow debate,           
proponents of the view that consciousness overflows reportability argue that the rule “when             
subjects are conscious of something, they can report being conscious of that thing” is not               
reliable, while opponents to that view claim that it is. If scientists disagree on which detection                
rules to use, rejecting them is less costly than if they were largely accepted within the                
scientific community. In other words, disagreement over which detection rules to use lowers             
the price of rejecting them. Consequently, I hypothesize that, because consciousness           
scientists often disagree on which detection rules are reliable, rejecting these rules typically             
comes at almost no price. In a slogan: no detection rule is too big to fail. As a result, what                    
one should do in front of (seemingly) disconfirming evidence is underdetermined: if one             
gives more credence to one’s hypothesis than to the reliability of the detection rule used to                
test it, rejecting the detection rule to save one’s hypothesis is ​prima facie not an irrational                
thing to do. Hence, the rejection of detection rules could foster underdetermination because             
it provides a cheap way of saving one’s preferred hypotheses. 
One solution to settle disagreements over which detection rules to use could be to              
attempt to demonstrate the reliability of detection rules themselves. To do so, one could              
provisionally take a detection rule as a hypothesis and attempt to confirm it. For example, a                
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 confirmation of the hypothesis that “when subjects perform a rational action based on a              
sensory cue, they are conscious of that cue” could allow us to justify using the corresponding                
detection rule. In that case, rejecting this detection rule would be more costly.  
However, a problem emerges when one attempts to increase the price of rejecting             
detection rules in this way. Indeed, I argued, first, that consciousness scientists use             
detection rules to test hypotheses, and, second, that consciousness scientists typically           
disagree on which detection rules to use. As such, testing a hypothesis corresponding to a               
detection rule will necessitate the use of other detection rules, and will itself be open to                
underdetermination. To illustrate this, imagine that we want to confirm the following            
hypothesis: “when subjects have conscious visual sensations, they can report having those            
sensations”. To do so, we need a way of knowing when subjects are conscious or               
unconscious of sensations that would not rely on reports. In turn, this implies relying on a                
detection rule, the use of which might itself turn out to be contentious. Consequently, the               
underdetermination that pervades when testing hypotheses in consciousness science might          
also apply when detection rules themselves are taken as hypotheses. Many authors, as             
Cohen & Dennett (2011), or Kouider et al. (2010), doubt that the overflow debate could be                
solved empirically for precisely this reason: it is unclear what detection rule could be used to                
assess the presence or absence of consciousness in order to test the hypothesis that              
subjects can report what they are conscious of. Hence, taking detection rules as hypotheses              
to show that these detection rules should be considered reliable is unlikely to provide a               
straightforward way of increasing the cost of their rejection. And if raising the cost of               
rejection of detection rules is quite difficult, underdetermination is all the more persistent. 
In sum, I have suggested that underdetermination in consciousness science is           
persistent, first, because the systematic possibility of rejecting detection rules is a ​prevalent             
factor of underdetermination, second, because these rules are ​cheap to reject​, and, third,             
because it is ​difficult to show that detection rules should be considered reliable​. These three               
factors combined lead to a situation in which one can ​typically save one’s preferred              
hypothesis by rejecting a detection rule ​at ​almost no price, with ​little hope for agreement on                
detection rules. I suggest that, in such situation, one should expect underdetermination to be              
persistent in consciousness science. In turn, I have argued that persistent           
underdetermination could be a unifying explanation for long-standing lack of consensus in            
the field. 
To be clear, I do not claim that there is nothing that scientists could do to reduce                 
underdetermination in the future, or that they could not ultimately come to an agreement on               
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 which detection rules should be considered “too big to fail” . Instead, my claim is that the                29
underdetermination of the study of consciousness by the evidence is a good explanation of              
the long-standing lack of consensus on problems like that of finding the physical basis of               
consciousness or knowing whether subjects perceive more than they can report. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the 19th century, scientific debates surrounding consciousness have remained          
unsettled. The lack of consensus observed in the contemporary science of consciousness is             
also a feature of the early study of consciousness. I hypothesized that long-standing             
disagreements in consciousness science could be explained by the underdetermination of           
theories of consciousness. Indeed, the history of the study of consciousness leaves us with              
the impression that the early science of consciousness was like a game whose rules could               
be changed at will, and in which theories could be preserved “come what may”. I suggested                
that the contemporary science of consciousness does not reach consensus either, which            
might indicate that our contemporary theories could be similarly underdetermined by the            
evidence. Finally, I hypothesized that debates over which detection rules to use could             
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29 As an anonymous reviewer remarked, there ​is some agreement on elementary detection rules in               
consciousness science, for instance, the rule that positive introspective reports of the kind “I saw the                
stimulus” should be interpreted as indicating consciousness of the stimulus, in normal conditions. As              
such, there is at least a relative consensus that positive introspective reports are reliable. The problem                
here is to find the best way for the subjects to make these reports (Michel, forthcoming; Sandberg et                  
al., 2010), such as to avoid report biases (Irvine, 2012). Perhaps developing so-called “bias-free”              
detection procedures based on introspective reports would lead to further progress in consciousness             
science (see, e.g., Peters & Lau, 2015). 
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